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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OTAH
ELIZABETH IRENE REISER, by
and through her guardian,
RICHARD E. REISER, and ELEANOR:
RESIBR,
Case No. 16,444

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
RICHARD LOHNER and HOWARD
FRANCIS, Medical Doctors, and
PROVO OBSTETRICAL AND GYNECOLOGY CLINIC, INC., a Professional corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is important to clarify several characterizations of
fact recited in respondents' brief.
Dr. Francis and Dr. Lohner both testified that the
rotational system of seeing patients mandates that the
"progress sheet" on each patient be properly filled out disclosing relevant information to the next doctor who might see
the patient.

The progress or cover sheet is a printed form

supplied by a medical supply house (R.1231-32) which contains
spaces for various notations to be made by the doctors during
prenatal examinations.

(R.1226). The form has a line stating

"Rh negative" which Dr. Lehner circles when he has a patient
who has that particular problem.

(R.1231-32). It is undis-

puted that the fact that Mrs. Reiser was Rh negative was first
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written on the chart by Dr. Lehner on June 24, 1971, Mrs.
Reiser's thirty-eighth week of pregnancy.

(R.1232).

As compared with the whole series of titer tests run on
Mrs. Reiser during her previous pregnancy, the highest of
which was 1:4,

(R. 1727, 1753), Dr. Lehner, because of the

failure to note her Rh sensitivity earlier, ran only one
titer test during her

thirty~eighth

week of pregnancy which

was 1:128, approximately thirty times higher than the highest
test result obtained in her previous pregnancy.

Dr. Lohner

testified that he had seen severe involvement of the baby

with a titer test as low as 1:8 or 1:16 (R.1510) and according'
had induced labor in the previous pregnancy when the titer
reached 1:4. (R.1727,1753). Because Dr. Lehner did not
perform a series of titer tests, he was unable to determine
how fast the antibodies were building up.

It was because of

that failure that the amniocentesis was performed.
The respondents do not take issue with the fact that
Mrs. Reiser was not warned of all the possible adverse
effects of the amniocentesis procedure (R. 1243, 1517-18),
nor do respondents contend that there was any communication
with Richard Reiser to inform him of the risks or to seek
his assistance in persuading Mrs. Reiser to submit to induced
labor.

(R. 1244-45).

Dr. Lehner testified that the only risks of the amniocentesis procedure that were explained to Mrs. Reiser were
the-risks that the baby might be stuck with the needle a~
that the procedure might induce infection within the uterus.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(R. 1518).

No explanation was made as to the risk of vaso-

vagal syndrome or supine hypotensive syndrome although such
a risk was known to Dr. Lohner and the nurses.

(R.1218-19,

1222-1229).
As Mrs. Reiser was being prepared for the amniocentesis,
Dr. Lohner testified that he took the blood pressure and it
was low (R.1251), but because of the unexpected occurrences,
he did not record the blood pressure on the chart.

(R.1522).

Dr. Lohner testified that it was his practice to record the
measurements as he was leaving the room and before seeing
another patient,although his nurse, Mrs. Nielson, testified
that she ordinarily records and documents the doctors'
examination findings while with the patient.

(R.1163-1167).

Nurse Nielson had no recollection of the blood pressure of
Mrs. Reiser being taken on June 26, 1971.

(R. 1163).

As

pointed out at trial, Dr. Lohner stated in his deposition of
August 3, 1974, that he left Mrs. Reiser's room after the
amniocentesis to examine another patient in another examining
room, yet still did not record a blood pressure for Mrs.
Reiser.

(R.1522).

In any event, no blood pressure was

recorded.
Subsequent to the performance of the amniocentesis by
Dr. Lohner, wherein Mrs. Reiser was on her back for a considerable period of time, she suffered a cardiac arrest.

It is

undisputed that the nurses did not start any resuscitative
measures, instead, they left the room to look for smelling
salts, which were never found.

(R. 1178-1179).

Mrs. Reiser
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....
was cyanotic and was allowed by the nurses to remain in a
supine position.

Mrs. Nielson summoned Dr. Lohner who

attempted to use, for the first time, an ambu bag.

(R,13

531

Dr. Lohner could not get a good seal around the mouth and
accordingly discarded the apparatus which was capable of
delivering significantly more oxygen to Mrs. Reiser than the
use of mouth to mouth resucitation.

(R.1317-18, 1535).

Dr. Lehner performed both the mouth-to-mouth

resuscit~

tion and the heart massage and did not seek the help of
either of the two nurses.

(R. 1535).

As explained by Dr.

Banner, the plaintiff's expert, the procedure used by Dr.
Lohner aggravated the anoxia of the baby unnecessarily,
since there were medically trained persons in the office.
Dr. Banner and Dr. Roach testified that when two persons
work together, one on mouth-to-mouth and one on cardiac
massage, the amount of oxygen exchange is greatly increased.
(R. 1316-17, 1405-1406). At no time did Dr. Lohner place a
pillow or other device under Mrs. Reiser to transfer the
weight of the baby off of the inferior vena cava, in order
to provide increased circulation.
The respondents make the statement that all of the
experts in this case agree that never in medical history has
the performance of an amniocentesis led to a cardiac arrest.
But the respondents omit the important qualification that
when an amniocentesis or surgical procedure is performed in
late pregnancy, the patient is not laid supine on a hard
table; instead, she is laid on the right side and cushions
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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.

are used lo support the back.

An obvious explanation for

the absence of a similar occurrence in medical literature is
that Dr. Lohner, in contravention of: basic tenets of
obstetrics, allowed the plaintiff to lay supine on a hard
table for an extended period of time through the examination,
amniocentesis and the resuscitation efforts.

Hopefully,

such errors in judgment and management are not common.
Further, Dr. Roach explained that in a short period of
years the Rh disease has been identified, therapeutic
modalities developed to treat it, and finally, medical
treatment discovered to prevent it.

(R. 1369-80). Accordingly,

the use of the amniocentesis procedure in a Rh disease case
became antiquated in a short time.

The chance that that

development would be coupled, in medical literature, with
supine hypotensive syndrome or vasovagal syndrome and then
again with cardiac arrest and be recognized and reported as
such are slim although each is separately known to arise in
similar circumstances.

(R. 1369-70). The respondents' state-

ment is analogous to researching a case where a man in a
green shirt had a cardiac arrest while snow skiing.

No one

would doubt the authenticity or the possibility of their
relation, but the chances of the report drawing all those
factors out are slim.
There is no dispute that all the doctors recognized
hypotensive syndrome, vasovagal syndrome and the other
factors in this case as known, significant obstetrical
occurrences.

-5-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE
THAT A TITER TEST WAS NOT TAKEN PRIOR TO JUNE
24, 1971, AND THAT THE FIRST AMNIOCENTESIS
WAS PERFORMED ON JUNE 26, 1971.
a.

Evidence can never be excluded merely because

it is not the proximate cause of an injury.
The respondents do not cite one case nor point to one
rule of evidence that states that unless an act of the
defendant is proven to the trial judge to be a proximate
cause of an injury, evidence of that act may be excluded.
The respondents do not take issue with the fact that the
plaintiff's experts, if allowed to discuss the subject,
would have testified to the causal connection between the
failure to take a series of titers, the performance of a
needless, ill-advised and dangerous amniocentesis at thirtyeight weeks and the subsequent hypotensive syndrome and
cardiac arrest.

(R. 1077-1078). Further, Dr. Banner would

have testified that, because of the low blood pressure
evident on June 24th, the failure to monitor the vital sigM
at the time of the performance of the amniocentesis on JuM
26th, was a departure from medical standards and was
causally connected to the result.

Dr. Banner would also haft

testified that the risk involved compared with the benefit
to be derived from a single amniocentesis was so small that
it was surely negligence to perform an amniocentesis under
those circumstances.

(R. 1078).
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Once expert testimony is proffered on the subject, the
question of proxiillate cause is a fact issue for the jury,
which province the trial judge usurped by his ruling.
Simply put, Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
as applied to this case, allows the exclusion of relevant
evidence only if its admission creates substantial danger of
undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading
the jury.

Federal cases interpreting Rule 403, which contains

the same provisions of Rule 45, state that in deciding the
question of admissibility, all doubt should be resolved in
favor of admissibility (see, e.g., United States v. Alison,
447F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1973)) and, if the evidence has probative
value, it is ordinarily admissible regardless of an imagined
reaction of the jury.

Travis v. United States, 266 F.2d

928, 939 (10th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds 364 U.S.
631 (1961).

The Court erred in adopting the test that

evidence may be excluded if it is not proven to be the
proximate cause of the injury and accordingly denied the
plaintiff of the right to have the matter decided by the
trier of fact.
b.

The defendants' own theory of the case

established the causal

connection between the faiiure to take

the previous titers and the injury.
While the defendants argued that the evidence of the
failure to take previous titers was not a proximate cause,
the defendants' experts made the causal connection.

In

explaining causation, the defendants' experts advanced the
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theory that the cardiac arrest was the result of a vasovagal
reflex.

The testimony of the defendants and their experts

is set out on pages 20-24 of the appellants'

initial brief.

The respondents totally misstate the evidence when they
represent that "[I] t

is admitted by plaintiffs that performing

the amniocentesis procedure itself, i.e., insertion

oft~

needles into the abdomen, had nothing to do with arrest."
(Respondents' brief, p. 12).

The whole thrust of the plain-

tiff's case is that the defendants' failure to take a series
of titers during the course of Mrs. Reiser' s pregnancy was
the reason Dr. Lohner performed the unnecessary and illadvised amniocentesis which is never performed in late
pregnancy. The causal connection to that point is clear.
The defendants' experts then testified that the actual
performance of the amniocentesis caused the vasovagal syndrom
which ended in a cardiac arrest.
1298-99, 1675-77).

(R. 1810-11, 1292-93,

The defendants' experts testified that

the vasovagal syndrome was well known to medical experts

a~

that most physicians are very much aware of its occurrence.
(R. 1822, 1810-11).

Further, Dr. Sharp testified that

patients have been known to go into cardiac arrest as a
result of the syndrome.

(R. 1810-11).

Dr. Sharp then testified that a patient who had a blo~
pressure of ninety-two over forty-four (the blood pressure
measured on Mrs. Reiser's prior visit) and was anxious and
apprehensive (the symptoms observed by Dr. Lohner and the
nurses) would be a fit candidate for the vasovagal syndrome.
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(R. 1821-22). The causal connection between the mismanagement

of the Rh condition, the needless amniocentesis and the
cardiac arrest could not be clearer.
Dr. Sharp also testified he ordinarily took a blood
pressure before performing an amniocentesis, that blood
pressure can change within a few minutes, and that quite
often when a woman in late pregnancy lies down, her blood
pressure drops.

(R. 1827-28).

The experts' testimony

establishes the defendants' negligence in failing to take
previous titers, failing to take a blood pressure, performing
the amniocentesis and failing to recognize and avoid vasovagal
syndrome which was caused by the amniocentesis process.
The defendants' argument that the jury, in determining
that there was no negligence in allowing Mrs. Reiser to stay
on her back, removed a link from the chain of causation is
totally specious.

It was impossible for the jury to evaluate

that precise point without the excluded evidence.

The jury

did not know that the plaintiff's and defendants' experts,
if allowed to be questioned on the subject, would have
testified that it was negligence not to perform a series of
titers commencing during the early stages of pregnancy; that
the results of one amniocentesis in late pregnancy is inadequate
for any competent physician to reach a diagnostic conclusion
concerning the involvement of the child; that they had never
heard of an initial amniocentesis being performed at thirtyeight weeks, and that under the circumstances of this case,
the amniocentesis was a useless, dangerous procedure that,
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according to Dr. Sharp, caused the cardiac arrest.
1070-74).

(R.

The jury did not know that Dr. Banner and Dr.

Roach would have testified that the failure to take a series
of titers, to note her Rh problem initially, perform an
amniocentesis in the earlier stages of pregnancy and otherwise
manage the Rh pregnancy was a departure from acceptable
medical standards and causally connected to the cardiac
arrest.

( R. 1076-78).

Finally, respondents indicate that Mrs. Reiser might
have suffered the same result if she was undergoing a

pro~r

procedure such as a vaginal examination or induced labor.
The critical difference is that in all such procedures, the
doctors testified that the patient is turned slightly on
back and supported with cushions to avoid the problem

~r

crea~d

by Dr. Lohner.
c.

The plaintiffs' theory of causation is suffi-

cient to prove proximate cause.
Numerous state courts have adopted different requirements
that a plaintiff has to meet in proving medical causation
because medicine is not an exact science.
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hamil

The decision of

v. -Bashline,

392

A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978), is discussed on pages 24-26 of the
appellant's brief.
The United States Supreme Court dealt with the subject
in Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107
(1959).

In that case, the Court eschewed the hackneyed

dogma that medical opinions on the issue of causation which
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included the defense-minded litany "reasonable medical
certainty."

In what remains today a leading opinion, the

Court held that the jury was entitled to consider all possible
medical conditions aggravating the plaintiff's worsening
health, and wrote:
The jury's power to draw the inference
that the aggravation of petitioner's
tubercular condition, evident so shortly
after the accident, was in fact caused
by the accident, was not impaired by the
failure of any medical witness to testify
that it was in fact the case. Neither can
it be impaired by the lack of medical unanimity as to the respective likelihood of
the potential causes of the aggravation,
or by the fact that other potential causes
of the aggravation and were not conclusively negated by the proofs. The matter does
not turn on the use of a particular form of
words by the physicians in giving their
testimony. The members of the jury, not
the medical witnesses, were sworn to make
a legal determination of the question of
causation. They were entitled to take all
of the circumstances, including the medical
testimony, into consideration.
Sentilles, supra, at 107 (1959).
In commenting upon the trial Court's responsibility
in these type of cases, the Court stated:
Though this case involves a medical issue,
it is no exception to the admonition that
"it is not the function of the Court to
search the record for conflicting circumstantial evidence in order to take the
case away from the jury on the th~ory t~at
the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences. The focal
point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury • • • • the very
essence of its [the jury's] function is to
select from among conflicting inferences
and conclusions that which it considers
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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most reasonable.
. Courts are not free
to re-weigh the evidence and set aside the
jury verdict merely because the jury could
have drawn different inferences or conclusions
or because judges feel that other results
are more reasonable.
[Citing cases.]
Sentilles, supra, at 110.
As stated by the Court in Hamil v. Bashline,

~·

the

degree of medical certitude demanded of expert testimony on
the issue of causation is lower where the alleged negligence
is failure to render proper medical treatment.

The Court

drew a distinction between the two classes of tort cases:

those in which the defendant's acts or omissions set in motion,
a force which resulted in harm; and those,
by the instant action),

(as represented

in which the defendant's acts or

omissions breached a duty to protect against harm from
another source.

The Court stated that in the latter type

of case, the "fact finder must consider not only what
did occur but also what might have occurred.

" had

defendants performed the service properly.
See also Kostamo v. Marquette Iron Company, 405 Mich.
105, 132-133, 274 N.W. 2d 411, 423 (1970); Jeanes v. Milner,
428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970).

See also Green v. Lilewood,

249 S.E. 2d 910 (S.C., 1978).
It is submitted that the plaintiffs causually connected
the failure to take prior titers and the performing of an
amniocentesis at thirty-eight weeks with the cardiac arrest.
Both the plaintiff's and defendants' expert would have
established the causation.

The elimination of such a critica
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1

and substantial portion of the plaintiff's case is not
supported by the rules of evidence nor the controlling law
of medical causation.
The respondent's claim that the injury to the plaintiffs
was not reasonably "foreseeable" and thus the defendants'
conduct could not be a "proximate cause" of the plaintiff's
injury is misleading.

(Respondents brief, pages 14-16).

It

is the respondents' contention that since a cardiac arrest
had never, in medical history, resulted from an amniocentesis
procedure, the defendant doctors should not be held to a
duty to have forseen the potential risk.
The test for proximate cause has been variously defined
by several courts, but as a general rule the test is defined
as follows:
A proximate cause has been defined as an
efficient cause and generally speaking,
it has been said that a cause is proximate
when it is not so remote in efficiency as
to be dismissed from consideration by the
court.
The test applied to determine
whether negligent conduct was the efficient, or proximate, cause of an injury
or loss suffered by the claimant is
whether such conduct is a cause without
which the injury would not have taken
place, or is the efficient cause which set
in motion the chain of circumstances leading
up to the injury.
In other words, a
cause, to be efficient and proximate,
need not be the sole cause of the injury;
it is enough that it is a "proximate concurring cause." The fact that other
causes concurred with the negligence of
the defendant in producing an injury does
not relieve him from liability unless it
is shown that the other causes would have
produced the injury independently of his
negligence. The rule is that where an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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efficient adequate cause for injuries has
been found, it must be considered as the
true cause, unless another, not incident
to it, but independent of it, is shown to
intervene.
57 Am.Jur. 2d 401, Negligence §145.
A vital inquiry in any case involving proximate cause
is whether the negligent act set in motion a natural and
unbroken chain of events that led directly and proximately
to the injury.
Normally a titer is performed on the first visit of an
expectant Rh mother to the doctor's office (R. 268).

Mrs.

Reiser had been seen by Dr. Francis from her first visit
until her visit on June 24, 1971.

At that point, Dr. Franci

was unavailable so Dr. Lehner visited with Mrs. Reiser.
During that visit, he discovered that the mother was Rh
sensitized and that no titer had been performed to that
date.

Dr. Lohner immediately ordered a titer which he

subsequently discovered was extremely high.

On June 26th,

he called Mrs. Reiser into his office and convinced her that
an immediate amniocentesis was necessary to determine the
degree of involvement of the child.

It was during the

performance of the amniocentesis on June 26th that Mrs.
Reiser had the cardiac arrest which resulted in the injury
to the child.
The respondents fail to realize that it was because of
their prior failure to perform a titer and prior failure ~
perform an amniocentesis that Dr. Lohner panicked at the
time of Mrs. Reiser's visit and ordered the immediate titer
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and amniocentesis.

Mrs. Reiser simply did not walk into Dr.

Lohner's office and lay down upon the table in order to have
an amniocentesis performed.

She was there because the

doctors had failed to make the proper test to diagnose the
condition of the child prior to that date.

As stated previously,

the issue of causation could not be clearer. The defendants'
own experts testified that the amniocentesis was the cause
of the vasovagal syndrome which in turn caused the cardiac
arrest.

Further, it cannot be disputed, that Dr. Sharp

and the other experts te,stified that the vasovagal syndrome
and hypotensive syndrome was well known to physicians and
that it had, in reported cases, led to a cardiac arrest.
Several other courts have dealt with similar cases.

In

Landeros v. Flood, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 551 P.2d 389 (1976), a
minor plaintiff brought a malpractice action against the
doctor for failing to diagnose battered child syndrome and
his failure to report the diagnosis of intentionally inflicted
injuries to the proper authorities.

The Supreme Court of

California held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action
in alleging that the doctor's omission in reporting the
first incident of child abuse was the proximate cause of the
subsequent injuries and that the intervening assaults by the
mother and her common-law husband were not superseding
causes of the injuries since the behavior was forseeable by
the doctor.

In so ruling, the Court stated as follows:

The second principal question in this case
is proximate cause. Under the allegations
of the comolaint it is evident that the
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z:q

continued beating inflicted on plaintiff
by her mother and R0yes after she was
released from the San Jose Hospital and
returned to their custody constituted an
"intervening act" that was the immediate
cause in fact of the injuries for which she
seeks to recover.
(Rest. 2d Torts, §441).
It is well settled in this state, however,
that an intervening act does not amount to
a "superseding cause" relieving a negligent
defendant of liability (Id., §440), if it
was reasonably forseeable:
"[A)n actor
may be liable if his negligence is the
substantial factor in causing an injury,
and he is not relieved from liability because
of the intervening act of a third person
if such act was reasonably forseeable at
the time of his negligent conduct.
[Citing
cases]. Moreover, under §449 of the Rest.
2d of Torts forseeability may arise
directly from the risk created by the
original act of negligence:
"If the
likelihood that a third person may act in
an particular manner is the hazard or one
of the hazards which makes the actor
negligent, such an act whether innocent,
negligent, intentionally tortious, or
criminal does not prevent the actor from
being liable for the harm caused thereby.
[citing cases].
As we recently observed with respect to
a determination of duty, however, "forseeability is a question of fact for the
jury."
[citing cases] • The same rule
applies where the issue is whether the
intervening act of a third person was
forseeable and therefore did not constitute a superseding cause:
In such
circumstances "the forseeability of the
risk generally frames a question for the
trier of fact."
[citing cases].
In Sanderson v. Moline, 7 Wash. App. 439, 499 P.2d 1281,
(1972), a malpractice action against a dentist based upon
alleged negligence diagnosis, care, and treatment which
allowed the plaintiff's dental condition to deteriorate W
an advanced stage of periodontal disease, the Court ruled
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that it was error for the trial court to remove from the
jury's consideration the evidence of the dentist's failure
to properly monitor the progressive deterioration of the
condition of plaintiff's teeth.

The Court stated:

We agree with plaintiff's objection to
the trial court's removal from jury
consideration of evidence of defendant's
failure to chart home care instructions
in the progressive deterioration of the
plaintiff's condition. Although the
Court's reason for the removal related
to the question of proximate cause of the
plaintiff's condition, which in isolation
was arguably correct, the ruling disregarded the fact that the testimony could
be significant in the jury's consideration
of the defendant's negligence in the care,
diagnosis and treatment of the plaintiff's
disease.
In Purcell v. Zindelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335
(1972), the Court sustained a denial of the motion in limine
by the defendant doctor to preclude the admissibility of
evidence of filing prior malpractice suits against the
surgeon. The Court ruled that the records were admissible
since they tended to show the doctor's inability to properly
treat the illness and his misconception of proper surgical
treatment.
More recently, in the case of Gildiner v. Thomas
Jefferson University Hospital, 451 F.Supp. 692 (E.D. Penn.
1978), the Court was faced with the problem of whether the
plaintiff parents had stated a cause of action for the
negligence of a physician in performing an amniocentesis to
determine whether an infant would be born with Tay-Sachs
disease:
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The defendants further argue that the
alleged negligence of the defendants, that
of not properly administering or interpreting the amniocentesis, was not the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damages.
The defendants argue that the damage
sustained by the plaintiff were caused
by the affliction of Andrew Lane Gildiner
with Tay-Sachs disease in that the defendants did not cause Andrew Lane Gildiner
to become afflicted with the disease • . •
Applying Pennsylvania law, we decline
to follow Gleitman v. Cosgrove in similar
cases. We hold that the relevant causal
relationship is that between the defendants' negligence in performing or interpreting the amniocentesis and the subsequent birth of Andrew Lane Gildiner. The
complaint states a sufficient causal relationship between the alleged negligence of
the defendants and the failure of Mark and
Linda Gildiner to obtain an abortion to
defeat a motion for judgment on the pleadings based upon a lack of proximate cause.
Even apart from the proximate cause of injury, the
failure of the doctors to take previous titers and amniocentesis was admissible as part of the medical record.

It

is axiomatic that all medical records in a medical malpractice
action should be admitted since they "constitute a substantial
portion of the information available" to the doctor upon
which the doctor "partially bases his operative decisions
and thus are material and relevant."

Sandoval v. Daniels,

532 P.2d 759 (Colo. 1975).
The plaintiffs will not attempt to restate the testimony
that the defendant doctors and the experts called to testify
in this case all recognized hypertensive syndrome, vasovagal
syndrome and the accompanying risk of cardiac arrest and
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anoxia to be significant, known obstetrical occurrences.
The vice of the respondents' statement and allowed argument
to the jury to the effect that "never in medical history has
a cardiac arrest follov1ed from an amniocentesis," is twofold.
First, the plaintiffs were precluded at trial from introducing
evidence to show that amniocentesis are never performed in
the late stages of pregnancy, and accordingly, no significant
portion of the population has ever been subjected to the
treatment imposed by these defendants and thus there is no
recorded history.

Secondly, the statement totally misconstrues

and misstates the circumstances relating to the procedure.
In all of the medical literature, and from the testimony
of every expert at trial, there has never been a case where
an amniocentesis was initially performed at thirty-eight
weeks to determine the effect of Rh negative antigens in
the child's blood.

In fact, the graph perfected by Dr. A.

W. Liley and used by Dr. Lehner in this case, does not
extend beyond thirty-seven weeks.

Since Dr. Lehner, performed

this first initial amniocentesis at thirty-eight and half
weeks, he had to tape additional paper on the edge to plot
his results because of the physical limitations of the
graph.

(R. 288).

The overwhelming body of medical litera-

ture on the subject is all in the agreement that the defendants' use of the titers and amniocentesis was contrary to
accepted medical procedure.

(R. 288-290).

Even Dr. Stenchever, the defendants' expert, in his
published ;rticles adopting procedures contrary to those used
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by the defendants.

Of all the amniocentesis performed by

Dr. Stenchever for study of the Rh factor,

there were never

less than two amniocentesis performed and none after thirtysix weeks.

(R.

290).

The plaintiff was prevented from cross-

examining Dr. Stenchever in this regard.
Aside from the extremely unusual use of the amniocentesis
in the late stages of pregnancy, it is important to understand that the amniocentesis process, as related to Rh
involvement diagnosis, was very short lived and affected a
minimal number of women.

The process was not in general

clinical use until approximately 1965.

(R.

291, 1369-80).

In 1968, the antedate Rhogam was clinically available, which
is the process by which an Rh sensitized mother may, by
innoculation, be immunized from further Rh negative contamination, consequently, only mothers who were Rh sensitized
prior to 1968 are proper candidates for an amniocentesis
procedure to determine Rh involvement of the fetus.

(R.

291, 1369-80).

For the defendants to contend that there is no statistical record of cardiac seizure following an amniocentesis
has no significance.

Persons such as Mrs. Reiser fit within

a small category because Rh negative sensitization affects
only a limited number of people. Second, those few persons
sensitized were not always given an amniocentesis as
illustrated by Mrs. Reiser's fourth and fifth pregnancies.
Third, none of those tested were tested in the thirty· tics
eighth week (advanced pregnancy). Fourth, medical statis
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

are not required to be kept or assembled.
It is established that supine hypotensive syndrome is
so commonly known that there is no record of a competent
physician allowing, let alone requiring, his patient to lie
flat on her back, on a hard table, for more than five minutes
when in her thirty-eighth week of pregnancy.

Finally,

statistical evidence as related to cardiac seizure under
circumstances such as presented in this case is not recorded
under the title "amniocentesis," but is noted under other
topics.

There is a plethora of authorities for cardiac

seizure following and during anesthetic procedures with
accompanying supine hypotensive syndrome.

Simply put, when

respondents say that there is no history of cardiac seizure
from an amniocentesis at thirty-eight weeks, they might also
say that there is no history of an amniocentesis ever being
performed for Rh negative sensitation for the first time at
thirty-eight weeks.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING A SPECIAL
VERDICT TO THE JORY AND THE VERDICT
FORM DID NOT ADEQUATELY ALLOW THE JURY
TO CONSIDER PLAINTIFFS' THEORY OF THE
CASE.
In their original brief, the appellants set out the
evidence supporting the issues of negligence that should
have been submitted to the jury.

In that brief, the appellants

list nine questions, many with subparts, that the plaintiffs
had a right to submit to the jury.
30-36).

(Appellants brief, pages

The respondents make essentially two responses.
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First, it is their contention that the two negligence
questions submitted by the court to the jury properly
present all of the issues to the jury.

The respondents do

not claim that the appellants did not have the right to
tho~

present the various issues to the jury, but only that
issues were encompassed into

the two negligence questions

submitted to the jury or were waived.
It seems incredible that the respondents would have
this Court believe that the question "Was defendant,

Richa~

Lohner, negligent in allowing Mrs. Reiser to lie on her back
for an excessive period of time?", was to be interpreted by
the jury as including, 1) were the nurses negligent in
failing to timely recognize Mrs. Reiser's symptoms;2) were
the nurses negligent in failing to take timely steps to
relieve the symptoms; 3)

were the nurses negligent in

failing to seek the assistance of the doctor rather than
tamper with a developing emergency; 4) did Mrs. Reiser
suffer from a vasovagal syndrome as suggested by Dr. Sharp
and Dr. Lobner and if so, was it negligence not to anticipate such an occurrence and be prepared with counter measures;
and 5) did Mrs. Reiser suffer from a hypotensive syndrome
and if so, was it negligence not to anticipate such an
occurrence, to lay the patient on her side and be prepared
with counter measures?
Further, the respondents would have this Court believe
that the question "Was the defendant, Richard Lobner, negligen:
in the acts and efforts utilized or not utilized to resuscitat:
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Mrs. Reiser during the time she was unconscious?", encompassed
the issues:

1) were the defendants negligent in failing to

have adequate and operative resuscitative equipment on the
premises such as drugs, oxygen, inhalers, and intubation
equipment; 2) were the defendants negligent in not maintaining a ready emergency or crash guard--fully equipped
with drugs, oxygen, etc.; 3) were the defendants negligent
in failing to train and prepare the nursing staff in emergency
resuscitation measures; and 4) was Dr. Lohner negligent in
failing to utilize the assistance of nurses in the rescue
measures taken when the proof indicated that two or more
persons can provide significantly more resuscitation than
one man attempting chest pressure and mouth-to-mouth resuscitation at the same time?
There can be no question that the issues of whether or
not Dr. Lohner was negligent in allowing Mrs. Reiser to
reject induction under the circumstances of the case and
whether the defendants were negligent in failing to initially
and periodically consult with Dr. Reiser to discuss the
nature of the problem and their urgent concern, were clearly
issues not encompassed, in any degree, within the interrogatories submitted to the jury.

Further the issues of informed

consent and the issues relating to the excluded evidence
were also not given to the jury in any fashion.
The only other response made by the defendants is that
the plaintiffs waived the right to present those issues to
the jury.

such an argument totally misconstrues the under-
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standing of court and counsel.

Counsel indicated to the

court, that because of the granting of the motion in limine,
excluding significant portions of the plaintiffs case, the
issues which could be submitted to the jury were greatly
restricted.

At no time did counsel make any waiver of the

right to submit all the issues to the jury and any argument
to the contrary is a gross misconstruction of the record.
(R. 1865, 1087-1090).

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE TO
THE JURY THE ISSUE OF INFORMED CONSENT.
The appellants will rely on their initial brief to
support their contention except to comment that Mrs. Reiser
surely should have been advised that 1) an amniocentesis is
never performed at thirty-eight weeks and, 2) the risks of
hypertensive syndrome and vasovagal syndrome.
POIN'f IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS
FIRST AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION.
a.

The plaintiffs should have been granted a

trial on the applicability of the statute of limitations.
In its initial brief, plaintiffs cited U.C.A. 78-12-47
for the proposition that applicable Utah law grants either
party to a medical malpractice action the right to a trial
on the issue of the statute of limitations.

Defendants have

countered by saying that the statute is permissive in
nature, and not mandatory.

Although it is possible that a
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literal interpretation of the statute might yield such a
conclusion, several factors militate against it.
If, as defendant seems to claim, application of the
statute of limitations is primarily a question of law to be
decided by the court, then the statute has virtually no
effect and is surplusage to the Code.

Such is not the case.

It is obvious that the legislature recognized the difficult
factual problems involved in applying the statute of limitations
to medical malpractice actions, and therefore carved out a
special exception.

It is true that the specific language of

the statute is that the issue "may" rather than "must" be
tried separately, but it is obvious from the mere existence
and general tenor of the statute, that the legislature
recognized the importance and difficulty of the statute
limitations in malpractice actions, and sought to preclude
a mechanical application thereof by a court acting

without

a jury.
Furthermore, 78-12-47 is a reinforcement of the Utah
Supreme Court's stand on the nature of summary judgment.
First, upon motion for summary judgment, the trial court is
required to consider all relevant facts and their reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion is made.

The Utah Supreme Court noted in

Controlled Receivables Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah2d 420, 413
P.2d 807 (1966) as follows:
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A motion for summary judgment is a harsh
measure, and for this reason plaintiff's contentions must be considered in a light most to
his advantage and all doubts resolved in favor
of permitting him to go to trial; and only if
when the whole matter is so viewed, he could,
nevertheless, establish no right to recovery,
should the motion be granted.
Second, if the facts and their reasonable inferences when
viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party are
in dispute, summary judgment is simply improper.

In

Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975) the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
It is nottbe purpose of the summary judgment
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of the parties or witnesses or the weight
of the evidence. Neither is it to deny parties
the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues
of fact.
Its purpose is to eliminate the time,
trouble and expense of trial when upon any view
taken of the facts as asserted by the party
ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail.
Plaintiffs, in connection with their Memorandum in
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 790-791)
submitted affidavits containing facts that substantially
controverted those submitted by defendants.

Those facts put

the statute of limitations in dispute as a material iss~ of
fact.

The lower court apparently ignored the fact that a

genuine dispute existed and granted defendants' motion.
Such action was clearly error, violating the spirit of
U.C.A. 78-12-47, and the letter of Rule 56(c) URCP (summary
judgment).

-26-
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b.

The lower court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs'

cause of action for Emotional Distress to the Parents.
Defendant has cited a variety of cases for the proposition that no cause of action arises for negligently inflicted
emotional distress.

Counsel for plaintiff would reiterate

the position taken in his initial brief, i.e., that the Utah
cases denying recovery for emotional distress are inapplicable,
that justice requires that relief be afforded, ~nd that this
Court should recognize such a cause of action.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the court erred in granting the defendants' Motion in Limine, and, consequently, the court erred
in failing to properly treat the issue of informed consent
and in failing to submit a proper verdict to the jury.

In

addition, the court erred in granting the defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment on Mrs. Reiser's cause of action for
her own personal injuries, and on the parents cause of
action for emotional distress.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of November, 1980.
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HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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